Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan’s call for the group to disarm presents a historic opportunity for peace with Turkey. Tamsin Hunt and Saif Islam explore the promises and obstacles on the path toward a lasting resolution.
“Convene your congress and make a decision. All groups must lay their arms and the PKK must dissolve itself,” said Öcalan from the İmralı prison off Istanbul. The momentous announcement from the leader and founding member of the PKK – a group that has waged an armed struggle against the Turkish state since 1984 in response to the suppression of Kurdish political, cultural and economic rights – sent ripples across the Middle East. Behind the scenes, the far-right Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahçeli has been holding talks with Öcalan since October last year, with full support from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Öcalan’s message represents a significant departure from previous ceasefires between Turkey and the PKK.”
Öcalan’s message represents a significant departure from previous ceasefires between Turkey and the PKK. Historically, ceasefires were deployed as temporary measures aimed at facilitating negotiations or reducing hostilities, without leading to a permanent resolution. In contrast, Öcalan’s recent appeal explicitly urges the PKK to permanently lay down arms and disband, seeking a definitive end to the armed struggle. A number of local and regional developments have culminated in both sides recognising the benefits of a permanent settlement at this stage, although there also remain several obstacles that may complicate the peace process.
Mutual interests driving the search for peace
Turkey and the PKK both have compelling reasons to explore a ceasefire. For Turkey, President Erdoğan’s political calculations are a key motivation. His ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered a major defeat in the 2024 local elections. Securing peace with Kurdish groups could help him regain support and, crucially, build the political backing needed for constitutional amendments that would allow him to extend his presidency beyond 2028.
Beyond domestic political considerations, resolving the conflict with the PKK would allow Turkish forces to redirect resources away from costly military operations in Iraq and Syria, where the PKK and the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) operate, respectively, and have been the targets of Turkish offensives. Turkey has long viewed the SDF as an extension of the PKK. The Turkey-PKK talks come at a time of significant upheaval in Syria, and Erdoğan has thrown his support behind the new government under President Ahmad Al Sharaa; an alliance strengthened by the recent deal in which the SDF agreed to integrate into the structures of the Syrian interim government.
For the PKK, military setbacks have significantly constrained its operations. Since 2015, Turkish security forces have intensified the counter-insurgency campaigns, limiting the group’s ability to sustain operations within Turkey. The PKK has been further weakened by relentless Turkish strikes in Iraq, making negotiations a potentially attractive alternative. The PKK likely sees peace talks as a pragmatic step to secure political gains where military options have failed.
Kurdish inhabited areas in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran
Challenges ahead
Most of the PKK has agreed to lay down arms, after the group’s executive declared a unilateral ceasefire on 1 March. However, the path to lasting peace remains long, and fraught with potential obstacles. The PKK is not a single, cohesive group, and its offshoots and allied Kurdish militias stretch across regional borders; from the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) in Iran and Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PÇDK) in Iraq, to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria – which comprises a large part of the SDF’s armed forces. If this latest peace process is successful, and if, at the end of it, the PKK is dismantled, it remains uncertain whether groups in Iraq, Syria and Iran will follow suit. The YPG has its own objectives and has already refused to disarm, and its future remains the subject of uncertainty under the landmark deal between the SDF and Syrian state. As a result, Turkish airstrikes on Kurdish targets in Iraq and Syria continue, with 26 people killed over the week that directly followed Öcalan’s announcement. These attacks may serve to alienate some factions, including the hardliners among the PKK’s operational command in Iraq’s Qandil Mountains, especially those already apprehensive over the fate of their fighters under any future agreement in Turkey.
Turkish airstrikes on Kurdish targets in Iraq and Syria continue, with 26 people killed over the week that directly followed Öcalan’s announcement”
There remains significant uncertainty over how Turkey will navigate the PKK’s dissolution and peace process. Pardons and clemency are extremely difficult under Turkey’s existing counter-terrorism legislation and criminal justice system, and the country’s constitution strictly prohibits autonomous legal structures within its jurisdiction, which runs counter to the PKK’s longstanding demands for Kurdish self-determination. Additionally, President Erdoğan has taken Turkey’s governance in an increasingly authoritarian direction, most recently arresting the popular mayor of Istanbul and prominent opposition leader, Ekrem İmamoğlu, on corruption charges. This shift has driven widespread unrest, and fears among Kurdish communities that the present government’s authoritarian and nationalistic tendencies leave little room for reconciliation. Although Turkish nationalist groups have signalled support for this latest peace process – with far-right leader Devlet Bahçeli himself suggesting Öcalan’s parole in October 2024 – the likelihood of Turkey’s nationalist factions facilitating reforms towards legislating Kurdish political and cultural identity remains highly uncertain.
Forging a new path, or repeating the past
This ceasefire is the best chance for lasting peace between Turkey and the PKK in almost 40 years, with considerable political, geopolitical and military factors motivating both sides. However, similar talks fell apart in 2015 – albeit under different circumstances both domestically and regionally – after two years of negotiations, and this latest agreement marks only the start of what promises to be a long and turbulent process. Negotiations over the coming years will be highly vulnerable Turkish identity sensitivities, legislative restrictions, and an array of decentralised Kurdish militant factions that may not agree to step into the fold.
