US President Donald Trump’s ‘America first’ policies and threats to withdraw from NATO have highlighted the urgency for European countries to decrease their reliance on US military support. However, significant challenges remain in realising security independence, write Neo Tsotetsi and Shannon Lorimer.
With the new US administration’s reprioritisation of its foreign policy agenda driving concerns that the US may leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and permanently end military aid to Ukraine, the urgency for European countries to curb their historic reliance on the US in the face of growing Russian aggression has become increasingly apparent. The European Union (EU) has noted the need to significantly bolster European-driven defence procurement and production capabilities, establish a council to facilitate coordinated decision-making on defence issues, and build an autonomous EU arm within NATO, alongside other financial measures to facilitate defence spending. Meanwhile, many countries like Germany and the UK have also independently indicated plans to increase defence spending. But, as Europe prepares for a scenario in which the US is no longer a security guarantor, significant challenges will slow the region’s efforts to establish security independence.
Reliance on the US
Decades of peacetime have resulted in defence spending cuts and a substantial decline in the military capabilities of European countries. As a result, whilst their interconnection with the US varies, Europe’s militaries rely on the US for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and currently lack sufficient personnel, firepower, and strategic and operational capabilities to operate independently from the US. These shortfalls have become increasingly apparent amid Europe’s efforts to support Ukraine; for example, while the UK and France possess long-range cruise missile systems, they lack long-range precision strike capabilities to match the scale of US systems.
Although Europe seeks to build its domestic production capabilities, this effort will likely take a number of years to comprehensively fill any gaps left by US weapons, equipment and operational support. ”
Meanwhile, in recent years, many countries in the EU have placed around two-thirds of their orders for defence equipment with US defence companies. But even in areas where European countries possess sophisticated equipment like the F-35 5th generation fighter jet – increasingly purchased since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – the use of these capabilities may still be largely reliant on US systems or services. There is currently no notable alternative aircraft with the requisite capabilities. Although Europe seeks to build its domestic production capabilities, this effort will likely take a number of years to comprehensively fill any gaps left by US weapons, equipment and operational support.
Defence spending in key European countries compared to the US
Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Reuters
Competing regional and domestic agendas
European leaders face further challenges in achieving regional security integration amid a lack of wider consensus – both among countries and within governments – on defence goals and priorities, as well as in aligning opposing attitudes towards the US and Russia. Firstly, the EU’s often laborious process of policy deliberation and consensus will continue to drive challenges to rapid decision-making and action within the bloc. For example, in 2023 and 2024, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán repeatedly vetoed the EU’s efforts to unlock around EUR 60 billion in aid for Ukraine to maintain the regime’s relations with Russia, which provides roughly two-thirds of Hungary’s energy. In March 2025, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni withheld support for EU arms spending, instead championing Ukraine’s ascent to NATO.
Beyond differing geopolitical alignments, domestic opposition could also hinder regional cooperation. Many countries have already committed to boosting defence spending. Germany passed a constitutional reform in March 2025 to remove its historic debt brake and allow for higher military spending worth 3 percent of its GDP by 2027, while the UK announced plans to increase spending to 2.5 percent of its GDP by 2027 – the biggest sustained spending growth since the Cold War. Polling suggests voters are largely supportive of this increased investment in defence, including in France, Germany and Spain. Nevertheless, amid high living costs and inflationary pressures, leaders could in time face opposition that may impact their willingness and ability to sustain such investment over the coming years.
Already, the Netherlands and Hungary’s parliaments have downvoted the EU’s EUR 800 billion ‘Readiness 2030’ proposal to finance increased defence spending, concerned that increasing the burden on heavily indebted member-states may trigger domestic financial crises in countries like Greece, Italy and Spain. In March 2025, for example, thousands marched in Rome to denounce the EU armament agenda and the potential impact of rising military expenditures on social welfare and public services. Meanwhile, polls in the UK have shown that Labour voters value welfare protections over defence spending, which could make Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s efforts to curb the UK’s welfare bill by EUR 6.8 billion a year unpopular.
Outlook
Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, and the new US administration’s shifts in foreign policy priorities are creating new urgency around European security and how it is achieved. While Europe faces a historic crossroad, the path to achieving security independence will be long and challenging. How these emerging ambitions will be achieved remains uncertain, particularly with the potential for domestic priorities to change along with incumbent governments. What is certain, however, is that European security capabilities and cooperation will look quite different in the coming years.
