In recent years, non-Western countries have increased collaboration on issues like security and trade. While unlikely to overtake traditional Western collectives like NATO or G7 in the near term, these partnerships reflect a slow but definitive shift in global power dynamics, write Saif Islam and Erin Drake.
From the US-China trade dispute, to wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, successive geopolitical crises in recent years have tested strategic relationships and geopolitical cooperation among states. This turbulence, complicated by domestic politics and strategic priorities, has in some cases reshaped security partnerships, trade blocs and other strategic alliances. The US is often a key player in these relations. However, its increasingly internal focus – likely to intensify under a second Donald Trump administration – continues to inform how its allies and rivals orientate themselves in the geopolitical space.
As these states coordinate to further their own agendas, questions have emerged around whether deepening partnerships are poised to act as a potential counterweight to Western interests and policies.’’
In this context, cooperation among states with a strong anti-US/Western orientation like Russia, Iran and North Korea has deepened, and partnerships among emerging economies like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) have strengthened. As these states coordinate to further their own agendas, questions have emerged around whether deepening partnerships are poised to act as a potential counterweight to Western interests and policies, with implications for regional security, global markets and geopolitical engagements.
Russia, Iran and North Korea: The challengers
Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have substantially deepened security cooperation, which – despite differences in their respective strategic objectives – is increasingly seeking to challenge Western influence in the Middle East, Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific. This collaboration has manifested through various military and economic exchanges. For example, Iran has supplied Russia with drones which have been utilised in Ukraine. Russia has reportedly recruited hundreds of Iran-backed Houthi fighters from Yemen to fight in Ukraine, and has provided Iran with unspecified military technology and financial support in return. In November 2024, Russia and North Korea ratified a mutual defence treaty, obliging both countries to provide immediate military assistance if either faces aggression. This followed reports that approximately 10,000 North Korean soldiers were deployed to aid Russia in its war against Ukraine. South Korean intelligence estimates that North Korea shipped more than 9 million artillery shells to Russia since 2022, and independent researchers suspect Russia supplied North Korea with over a million barrels of oil between March and November 2024 in violation of international sanctions.
Implications for regional security
- Ukraine and Europe: The involvement of Iranian drones, North Korean troops, and Houthi mercenaries has intensified the conflict in Ukraine. This external support has strengthened Russian military operations, leaving Ukraine in a vulnerable position amid growing speculation about reduced Western military assistance in 2025. The EU, despite pledging unwavering support to Ukraine last November, faces growing scepticism among some member states over whether a military solution is feasible. This division is further strained by uncertainties surrounding future US military support for Ukraine.
- The Middle East: Iran and its ‘Axis of Resistance’, including the Houthis and Hezbollah in Lebanon, find themselves in a precarious position after more than a year of conflict with Israel. The axis, particularly Hezbollah, suffered serious personnel and military losses. Russia, which values its relations with Israel, will continue to avoid any substantial involvement in the conflict on Iran’s behalf. The fall of the Bashar Al Assad regime in Syria, an ally of both Russia and Iran, would likely prompt Russia to seek practical relations with a new Syrian government while continuing its close coordination with Iran.
- The Korean Peninsula: South Korea is alarmed by the Russia-North Korea mutual defence treaty, the deployment of North Korean troops gaining combat experience in Ukraine, and the potential transfer of advanced Russian military technology to North Korea. Feeling emboldened by its strengthening ties with Russia, North Korea may undertake more aggressive military actions, such as missile launches, in 2025.
BRICS+: A geopolitical counterweight?
BRICS+: Initially formed in 2009 as a loose coalition to synthesise economic goals, BRICS has in recent years come to comprise over 40 percent of the world’s population, around 37 percent of global GDP, and a substantial portion of global trade. BRICS+ now includes major energy producers and exporters like Iran and the UAE, and several other states, including NATO ally Turkey, have sought membership.
BRICS+ leaders at the October 2024 Summit in Kazan, Russia
While collectively more moderate in their anti-US or anti-Western views than the Russia-Iran-North Korea trio, many BRICS+ members have become progressively more frustrated with prevailing Western political and economic dominance. Many have long protested that institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank do not sufficiently represent their interests, while expectations around decarbonisation and climate goals place an unfair economic burden on developing countries reliant on fossil fuel production and export. Meanwhile, the US dollar’s dominance has driven vulnerability to sanctions and tariffs as Western states seek to limit China’s global economic influence, and curb the behaviour of Russia, Iran and North Korea. Geopolitical disputes have led to US pressure on states like South Africa over its independent foreign policy and friendly stance towards Russia and Iran, threatening exclusion from major US trade agreements like the African Growth and Opportunity Act.
BRICS has sought to reduce dependence on the US dollar and undermine sanctions through local currency financing and developing alternate payment systems. Many members have also not observed Western sanctions against Russia, instead ramping up trade, and continuing to purchase Russian energy. The BRICS+ New Development Bank, developed as an alternative to the World Bank, has funded several major development projects, including a USD 300 million investment in India’s renewable energy sector.
Implications for geopolitical trade and diplomacy
While the BRICS+ behemoth moves towards alignment in common areas of interest, it remains a long way from achieving ‘counterweight’ status. With the inclusion of geopolitical rivals like Egypt and Ethiopia, and little homogeneity in their ideological makeup, political aspirations and economic models, achieving policy cohesion – such as a creating a common currency – will prove challenging. However, aims of securing greater independence from Western financial systems may yet, in the coming years, drive shifts in the geopolitical status quo:
- Tensions over China and Russia will keep straining diplomatic and trade relations between BRICS+ members and the West, adding pressure for countries like Brazil and South Africa to ‘pick a side.’ Under a Trump administration, which may seek harsher measures against states perceived as rivals, or those viewed as tacitly undermining Western goals, multilateral cooperation in other critical areas like climate change could become more arduous over the coming years.
- As the US doubles down on tariffs and sanctions, BRICS+ countries will continue to develop avenues for economic collaboration to reduce the impact of these measures. In the shorter-term, such economic support could buoy Russia’s economy and enable it to sustain its war efforts feeding into regional instability.
- Longer-term implications of membership growth and collaboration include bolstered clout in global trade dynamics and decisions, particularly in the energy sector. With Iran, the UAE and potentially Saudi Arabia, the bloc will comprise 42 percent of global oil supply, while many BRICS+ countries are rich in critical minerals needed for the green energy transition. Over time, efforts to shape energy supply chains, or coordinate investments or export restrictions on critical minerals, alongside the potential for influencing policy in collectives like the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+), could see BRICS+ countries have greater impact on shaping global energy markets.
A balancing of powers
Growing ties among non-Western countries are unlikely to drastically alter the global balance of power in the near term, with the US dollar maintaining dominance and differences in partners’ ambitions and development stages raising barriers to cooperation.
However, these alliances are transforming how states engage in geopolitical affairs. BRICS+ is likely to attract more countries frustrated by unfulfilled Western promises, fuelling calls for fairness and greater participation in global decision-making. Yet, some geopolitical configurations, such as the Russia-Iran-North Korea partnership, will have more destabilising consequences. Preventing competing ambitions from escalating into broader crises will require coordinated multilateral efforts, as global governance becomes increasingly fragmented and divergent interests drive tensions between emerging blocs.
