Despite high hopes for Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace plan, it has so far failed to reduce fighting between armed groups or limit their territorial expansion. With around a year left in office, Petro seems unlikely to secure a lasting military or financial victory over the country’s insurgent groups, writes Shannon Lorimer.
Upon assuming office in late 2022, President Gustavo Petro proposed a policy of ‘Paz Total’ (Total Peace) and commenced a series of peace negotiations with the country’s armed groups. Despite initial optimism for Petro’s plan, with successes including several ceasefire agreements, the plan has suffered numerous setbacks, with some of the country’s armed groups reportedly growing stronger. In fact, escalating attacks on government forces in some parts of the country signal that the challenges seen in implementing this plan may not be resolved within the remainder of Petro’s term, which ends in 2026
Petro’s ‘Paz Total’
Petro submitted his Total Peace plan to Congress in August 2022. The plan aims to introduce peace through dialogue, rather than armed resistance, and entails negotiating simultaneous ceasefires with multiple insurgent groups, as well as criminal groups, to end Columbia’s longstanding internal armed conflict. The plan empowers the government to negotiate with these groups separately and offer immunity or other concessions in exchange for permanent disarmament, the handover of any funds obtained illegally, and information on drug trafficking routes.
Although the group has continued some of its revenue generating activities, like kidnapping and extortion, and negotiations have broken down on multiple occasions, the ceasefire deal with ELN marks more progress than any other government has made since the start of peace talks in 1975.”
The plan has had some early successes, including a bilateral ceasefire agreement with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), one of the country’s largest insurgent groups. This ceasefire, which began on 3 August 2023 and was extended past its initial end date until July 2024, includes a commitment to adhere to international humanitarian law. This has prompted a significant improvement in the security environment, as it pushes the group to distinguish between soldiers and civilians in its armed activity. Although the group has continued some of its revenue generating activities, like kidnapping and extortion, and negotiations have broken down on multiple occasions, the ceasefire deal with ELN marks more progress than any other government has made since the start of peace talks in 1975.
Weaknesses of the Total Peace plan
Over the time that the government has engaged in talks with armed groups, the Total Peace policy has allowed militant groups to expand and increase in power without the interference of the military, and yet has not secured significant concessions in return. The ceasefire agreements require the government to cease military operations against the groups, but do not require armed groups to stop their involvement in illegal economies. Subsequently, the halt in military operations has provided a respite to criminal groups, allowing them to concentrate on recruitment of new members, and on battling rival organisations for control of strategic corridors. As a result, the EMC and various other groups have consolidated strategic territories in various regions of Southern Colombia, including Cauca, which has prompted an 85 percent increase in clashes with other groups vying for territory in the area.
Obstacles to peace
Yet, establishing the framework of the Total Peace plan has been a significant challenge. Petro has struggled to gain sufficient congressional support for the plan, leaving the government to continue negotiations without the much-needed legal groundwork in place. Although Colombia has a long history of negotiations with political opponents in the absence of these frameworks, the need to curb criminal activity makes such legal foundations for these talks critical. The government has also struggled to develop a coherent offering to persuade groups to commit to peace. Armed groups earn substantial profits from illegal activities and control huge territories, and Petro has thus far been unable to offer incentives for groups to relinquish control of these territories or stakes in illicit economies.
While brokering a ceasefire with the ELN has been one of Petro’s biggest achievements since commencing the policy, the federated structure of the group has complicated its enforcement. Divisions within the ELN have led to localised ceasefire violations and disagreements over proposed disarmament deals. The government has faced a similar obstacle in its negotiations with the Estado Mayor Central (Central General Staff, EMC), a federation of dissident factions of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), who elected not to participate in the 2016 peace agreement between FARC and the government. Only a fraction of these groups remains at the negotiating table and in March 2024, Pedro suspended the ceasefire with the EMC in several regions. Time is also a crucial factor in getting these deals right. The FARC peace agreement took four years to secure, with far broader support in Congress, indicating that Petro’s administration may struggle to reach the goal of total peace before the end of his term in 2026.
A shift in strategy?
Following breakdowns in peace negotiations with larger factions of armed groups, like the EMC, Petro has indicated a willingness to enter talks with smaller factions to broker lower-level ceasefires. The ELN’s Comuneros del Sur Front, for example, engaged in talks with the government alleging that the national level negotiations were yielding too few results. However, this approach is not without its risks. Talks with the Comuneros del Sur Front caused a brief halt to the national-level dialogue, and although the ELN later agreed to continue peace talks, they released a statement prohibiting double negotiations, indicating the government must only continue negotiations with one group. The move certainly was effective in getting the ELN back to the table and while it risks further progress with larger criminal organisations, this shift may yield some smaller victories in securing the disarmament of smaller factions similar to the 2016 peace agreement with FARC. This alone would be a significant achievement. However, if the ceasefires break down further, and illegal armed groups walk away from peace talks, Colombia could see an escalation of violence as criminal groups increase their territorial control.
