A proliferation in narcotics trafficking over the past few years, alongside the diversification of trafficking routes, has prompted an increase in drug-related violence. While some countries try to replicate El Salvador’s iron fist measures to reduce violent crime, others are turning to alternative, softer methods. Yet, it is not clear that either of these methods can guarantee success, writes Shannon Lorimer.
Despite ongoing efforts by governments in Latin America to clamp down on drug trafficking, both supply and demand of narcotics have continued to increase. Over the past decade, cocaine cultivation has increased in Peru and Bolivia, and reached record levels in Colombia, while global cocaine production has more than doubled. This growth has shifted and expanded trafficking routes throughout the region, increasing violence even in countries previously considered safer, as rival criminal organisations compete for control of strategic transhipment hubs. While some countries continue to favour a more militarised approach, with El Salvador showing the most promise in this respect, others have sought to learn from previously failed militarised strategies and are turning to softer methods. Neither method is without its challenges.
Coco cultivation in Colombia between 2013 and 2023
Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime
Bukele’s silver bullet?
In El Salvador, previously known as the ‘murder capital of the world,’ President Nayib Bukele launched one of the harshest crackdowns on organised crime in the region, responding to a wave of brutal gang massacres in late March 2022 in which 87 people died. While previous administrations had some success in clamping down on violence and reducing the homicide rate, the success of Bukele’s crackdown far surpassed the others, and highlights where other countries have struggled. Enabled by his party’s supermajority in the legislative assembly, Bukele has implemented drastic legal measures – such as broadening the definition of gang affiliation, and expanding state of emergency powers – allowing his government almost free reign in its war against the gangs, and facilitating the arrest of any actual or suspected gang members. Bukele’s policies have been criticised by human rights activists, with around 1.7 percent of the adult population currently incarcerated in the country’s prison system, most without trial. These measures are likely to be continually renewed with noticeable improvements in the security environment, but it remains to be seen whether this approach will result in a fundamental degradation in the capability of gangs, or simply suppress their activities in the short-term.
El Salvador's homicide rate over the past 10 years
Source: UN, The Economist and InSight Crime
More militarised crackdowns
Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa has employed a similar militarised response to a recent wave of violent crime in the country. However, without Bukele’s levels of political dominance, he has struggled to obtain sufficient congressional support for the continued states of emergency, threatening the sustainability of the crackdown. Despite a modest decline in homicides, the policies have not curbed the activities of criminal gangs, nor reduced attacks on political figures. In Honduras, President Xiomara Castro has similarly suspended constitutional rights to crackdown on violence and extortion, but with little to show for it. The percentage of households affected by extortion increased from 9 percent in 2022 to 11 percent in 2023, for instance. A significant improvement in Honduras’s security environment is unlikely in the near future, as state capture continues to weaken key institutions like the security services and judiciary, reducing their ability to capture and prosecute criminals.
A new approach
Both Colombia and Mexico have used their militaries in the war against drug cartels since the 1980s, but with little success. Subsequently, both have attempted alternative approaches. In Colombia, President Gustavo Petro initiated a peace process with criminal and militant groups in 2022, which included offering gang members reduced sentences and non-extradition in exchange for reporting cocaine export routes and handing over some illegally obtained fortunes. Despite modest successes, including ceasefires with smaller groups, the policy has not enjoyed sufficient congressional backing to support negotiations, and therefore failed to provide adequate incentives for criminal groups to participate. In Mexico, years of a largely unsuccessful war against drugs prompted then presidential candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), to craft his electoral campaign around a policy of ‘hugs not bullets,’ aimed at addressing the underlying socio-economic causes of criminality. Once in office, however, AMLO scaled back the approach, arguing that the gangs were more powerful than he realised, opting to retain a military presence in most affected communities to prevent a resurgence in violence.
More of the same
Increasingly well-resourced and funded criminal groups will continue to drive some governments across the region to lean towards iron-fist policies over more peaceful approaches. Meanwhile, domestic factors like resource limitations and divided congressional support will limit the efficacy of the militarised approach while inhibiting softer policies too. As organised crime surges across the Latin American region, and as more countries turn to a militarised response, with limited successes, El Salvador's improvement of its security environment appears to be the exception rather than the rule.
