On 16 January, Iran conducted missile strikes inside Pakistani territory, killing two civilians in Panjgur, Balochistan Province. The strikes targeted sites used by the Sunni militant group, Jaish Al Adl, and came amid a wider retaliation for an Islamic State suicide bombing, in which 95 people were killed, in the Iranian city of Kerman on 3 January. On 18 January, Pakistan responded with airstrikes against militant groups based near Saravan in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan Province, killing nine people, and both countries withdrew their respective ambassadors. Militant activity along the Iran-Pakistan border often serves to elevate tensions between the two countries; however, hostilities are typically resolved through diplomatic channels, and Iran and Pakistan agreed to de-escalate tensions on 19 January.
Militant attacks in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces increased in frequency in the days leading up to the general election on 8 February. Most notably, on 5 February, more than 30 unidentified militants attacked the Chaudhwan Police Station in Daraban, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing 10 police officers. Additionally, on 7 February, Islamic State militants detonated explosive devices outside two political offices in Pishin and Qilla Saifullah in Balochistan Province, killing 28 people. Attacks are common in these two regions outside of electoral cycles; however, authorities reported that 12 people were killed in 51 militant attacks on election day, most of which occurred in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with the specific objective of disrupting voting.
On 2 January, opposition leader Lee Jae-myung was stabbed in the neck at a news conference in Busan City. The attacker later admitted he had planned to kill Lee to prevent him becoming president. Then, on 25 January, an assailant hit a member of the National Assembly, Bae Hyun-jin, over the head with a rock in Seoul. These lone-wolf attacks have occurred months ahead of the legislative election slated for 10 April. South Korean politics is characterised by increasing polarisation along ideological and regional lines, and aggressive rhetoric, online smear campaigns, and sporadic acts of physical violence are likely to increase ahead of the April elections.
In January 2024, cocoa growers and other agricultural workers, along with various trade unions and civil society organisations, staged protests throughout Bolivia. They called for the resignation of magistrates after the Constitutional Court barred former President Evo Morales from running for re-election in 2025. The demonstrations heightened tensions between Morales and incumbent President Luis Arce, both from the ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, as Arce also intends to run for office. Protesters erected approximately 25 blockades countrywide, causing significant traffic disruptions and shortages of essential goods and fuel. While most blockades have been removed, the underlying tensions persist, driving the threat of further disruptive protests in the coming months.
On 8 January, President Daniel Noboa declared a 60-day countrywide state of emergency to combat escalating violence and labelled 22 criminal gangs as terrorist organisations. The following day, assailants stormed the set of the state-owned TC Televisión network in Guayaquil, Guayas Province, during a live broadcast, threatening to open fire on bystanders and to force staff to broadcast a message, likely in response to Noboa's crackdown. Gang violence has surged in recent months in Ecuador, featuring explosions, looting, and kidnappings targeting rivals and security officials. Despite a reported 67.8 percent decrease in the national homicide rate in January, the government's crackdown still threatens to provoke violent responses from criminal groups, including retaliatory attacks on government, security, and civilian targets.
In late January and early February, authorities reported numerous Islamophobic and antisemitic attacks across the country amid heightened tensions stemming from the Israel-Hamas conflict. On 29 January, federal prosecutors charged a man in Boston, Massachusetts, with threatening to kill members of the Jewish community and bomb a synagogue. The assailant left threatening voicemails with several synagogues and Jewish organisations across the state. Additionally, on 4 February, an attacker killed one person in a stabbing targeting a group of Muslims in Austin, Texas, following a pro-Palestine protest. Police are investigating the incident as a hate crime. US authorities continue to advise of a heightened threat of attack against US faith-based groups as a result of the conflict in the Middle East.
On 1 January, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) where landlocked Ethiopia would lease 20 km of Somaliland’s Red Sea coastline in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland's independence. This agreement has sparked diplomatic tensions in the Horn of Africa, particularly between Somalia and Ethiopia. On 6 January, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud nullified the MoU and asserted Somalia's readiness for war if diplomatic efforts fail to resolve the dispute. While the Somali National Army lacks the capability to engage in conventional warfare against Ethiopian forces, escalating tensions raise the possibility of a proxy conflict involving rival militias and groups such as Al Shabaab which aim to thwart the MoU's implementation.
On 1 February, renewed fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Al Fasher, the regional capital of North Darfur State, coming amid a series of RSF advances in recent months. With the RSF already controlling significant territory and critical oil infrastructure in Sudan’s southwest and Khartoum, it is now poised to carry out further offensives in the coming months to capture more territory from the SAF in its northern and eastern strongholds. The RSF's consolidation and expansion of territorial control underscore the increasing fragmentation of Sudan, increasing the potential of the country being divided and governed by competing RSF and SAF administrations.
Agricultural workers have staged demonstrations across Europe throughout January and February. Protesters blockaded major highways and border crossings in several countries including Germany, France, Belgium and Italy. Among agricultural workers’ concerns are subsidy cuts, high costs of production, competition from cheap imports, as well as environmental regulations they claim will be disadvantageous for the sector. The demonstrations have caused major disruptions to traffic, commercial activities and cross-border trade. While the European Union (EU) has shown a willingness to make some concessions on its environmental regulations, agricultural workers in some countries have continued their demonstrations arguing that the concessions do not go far enough.
In January and February, hundreds of thousands of people rallied against right-wing extremism across Germany. The protest action was triggered by an investigative media report alleging that members of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party secretly met with neo-Nazis to discuss the mass deportation of immigrants. The rising support for the party – opinion polls suggest that it is currently the second most-popular party in Germany – has stoked fears about democratic regression ahead of the municipal and European Union (EU) parliamentary elections in June 2024. This growing popularity will likely increase the threat of further disruptive demonstrations by pro- and anti-AfD activists in the coming months, particularly in the lead-up to the June elections.