Recent events in Syria have led to a dramatic shift in the country's political landscape. In early December 2024, opposition forces launched a swift and successful offensive against the government of President Bashar al-Assad. The rebels, led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, whose real name was recently revealed to be Ahmed Al-Sharaa (Al-Sharaa), rapidly captured major cities including Aleppo, Hama, and ultimately Damascus. On 8 December 2024, Assad fled Syria to Russia as rebel forces took control of the capital. This marked the end of over 50 years of Assad family rule in Syria. In this article Rateb Atassi and Bilal Sukkar take stock of the fall of the Assad regime and outline the challenges facing the interim administration.
The rapid change in power has created uncertainty about Syria's future. Over 1 million people have been newly displaced by the fighting. While some Syrian refugees are beginning to return, most are waiting to see how the situation develops before making decisions about repatriation.
The situation in Syria remains volatile. Hostilities continue to affect many parts of the country with airstrikes and clashes reported in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Daraa, and Al-Sweida. The northeast region, particularly Raqqa, remains unstable due to clashes between armed groups, blockades, and civil unrest. Curfews were imposed in the first few days in several areas, including Damascus, its countryside, Latakia, and Tartous, typically from evening to early morning. There have been several reports of looting and robbery, and news is still trickling regarding fighters stealing busses and fleeing to their home villages.
Turkey has intensified its attacks on the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria, and the conflict and tension between the two appears to be boiling over with no resolution in sight. In addition, Israeli strikes have significantly escalated in Syria, marking a new phase of intense military operations following the fall of the Assad regime. These strikes have targeted multiple strategic locations across the country, with a particular focus on dismantling Syria's military capabilities. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have also advanced in southern Syria, operating in villages in Quneitra and Daraa provinces.
Despite the challenges, the UN and partners are continuing humanitarian activities as the security situation permits. On December 15, Geir Pederson, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, arrived in Damascus. Pederson met with Al-Sharaa, as well as Mohammed al-Bashir, the prime Minister of the Caretaker Government, which was established on December 10. On December 16, Tom Fletcher, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, arrived in Syria, and held meetings with Al-Sharaa and members of the transitional authorities to discuss emergency aid delivery in Syria.
The transitional authority has taken steps to maintain government services and economic activities. After announcing a cabinet formed from members of the Syrian Salvation Government, which was the governing body in Idlib, it began attempts to restore security and basic services. The transitional authority granted a general amnesty to Syrian Arab Army (SAA) soldiers conscripted under compulsory service, and began recruiting police officers in Damascus, Hama and Homs. The transitional authority is also engaging international stakeholders in attempts to establish diplomatic ties, and has begun work to facilitate economic activity.
There remains many questions regarding the future. Can Al-Sharaa, who is the de-facto leader of Syria at the moment, replicate the same levels of security organisation he and the Salvation Government achieved in Idlib? Considering the multiple factions involved, the higher political stakes and involvement from various regional actors, the expanded territories under their control, and having to collaborate with the remnants of Assad’s government institutions, Syria faces a mountain to climb.
There are also questions regarding the political transition that is taking place. The transitional authority is set to last until March 2025, meanwhile the constitution and parliament will remain suspended. The UN Security Resolution 2254, adopted in December 2015 and outlined a roadmap for peace in Syria, is now under the spotlight as well. When Pedersen met with Al-Sharaa, the resolution was a subject of the conversation. The rapid change in Syria's political landscape has led to discussions on how much of the 2015 resolution is still applicable, with some experts and commentators suggesting that while parts of Resolution 2254 may no longer apply, core elements like establishing an inclusive government and drafting a new constitution remain relevant.
Addressing questions of transitional justice and reconciliation will be a delicate process too. There will need to be a balance between pursuing high-level officials responsible for war crimes while preventing retribution and antagonising communities hosting such figures. This will be a challenge considering the grievances against previous regime, most crucially families of forcibly disappeared who were not able to find their loved ones in detention centres and suspect existence of mass graves.
After It has emerged that millions in cash were shipped directly Syria’s Central bank to Moscow, and with the regime having been long known to have participated in drug trafficking to fill its coffers, it is becoming clearer that corruption was not simply a by-product of the Assad regime, but a central manner through which Assad maintained power and funded the state.
There are many questions over the possibility of recovery of state assets and wealth stolen by Assad and his allies. This work will require political capital, as any governing body will need to establish its legitimacy to make claims in civil courts worldwide and seek to have these stolen funds frozen and ultimately returned to the Syrian people. A key challenge will lie in identifying how Assad, his family members, and their networks, have dispersed their assets, the structures they have used to conceal them and unmasking the network of advisors and proxies who helped them do so.
Recovering funds from kleptocrats is far from straightforward. Importantly, these regimes have often had a decades long head start on any organisation – private or public – seeking restitution. In addition, they have been able to use the assets and wealth of the state to build complex asset protection structures and allies to place funds out of reach. Recent history such as attempts to track down the stolen assets of Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Moammar Ghadhafi of Libya indicates Syria faces an uphill battle and any efforts to recover assets will mostly likely only return a fraction of the immense wealth which has been funnelled out of the country.
The hope is that that the hard work of multiple civil society institutions will make the complex task of seeking restitution easier. Many NGOs and charities have been working to track the networks of investments and assets owned by the Assad family as well as their facilitators. The issue of finding and recovering Assad’s stolen wealth is particularly pertinent as both Iran and Russia have expressed their expectations that the new government will honour substantial debts accrued by the Assad regime. This stance underscores the complex financial and geopolitical implications of Syria's transition and the urgent necessity to seek justice for the Syrian people.
There will also be big question marks regarding the sanctions programmes on Syria. Several organisations and officials are urging the removal or easing of economic and political sanctions on Syria, and voices from European and US policy makers are already proposing the reconsideration of sectoral sanctions to facilitate reconstruction. How and when this will happen will depend on many factors. Terror designations for Syrian state entities and rebel groups continue to create obstacles for trade and reconstruction efforts, and for HTS to rid itself of the terror designation will take some work, as they will need to prove their willingness to shed their ideology. There will likely be some sort of easing of certain sectoral sanctions on Syria, and a phased approach to unwinding sanctions and export controls will likely follow.
As the situation remains fluid, the international community is grappling with how to use sanctions as a tool to support Syria's transition while ensuring accountability for past crimes and promoting a stable, inclusive future for the country. The current narrative centers on balancing the need for economic recovery with concerns about the new leadership's commitment to inclusive governance and human rights. The main challenge will be, even in the best case scenario, is the lifting of sanctions from all the sanctioning bodies, from the US and EU to the UN, which will likely be a complex and time-intensive legal process that requires sustained international cooperation and political will.
Every day since December 8 has been a pivotal crossroads, for Syria and the wider region, and while the future is shrouded in uncertainty, each day and each statement provides a little bit of clarity over what might come. Syrians face the daunting task of rebuilding state institutions, the country’s economy, and the social fabric after years of devastating conflict, and many in the region will be looking at this as an opportunity to increase their share of the pie.
The transition period ahead is fraught with potential pitfalls, including the risk of sectarian violence, power struggles among various factions, and the possible resurgence of extremist group. As Syria embarks on this uncertain journey, the international community watches closely, recognising that the outcome will have far-reaching implications for regional stability and global geopolitics.