The ceasefire in the Gaza Strip has coincided with US President Donald Trump introducing a plan for “owning” Gaza, which would entail the displacement of Palestinians to neighbouring countries. Such an event would have far-reaching political, social, and security repercussions for the region, but particularly for Egypt and Jordan, writes Tamsin Hunt.
US President Donald Trump was widely credited with facilitating the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, bringing a long-sought end to the 15-month war in the Gaza Strip. As the world’s attention turned towards planning the next steps for the Palestinian Territory, however, deep rifts emerged between the US and Israel’s recently stated plans for Gaza, and the widely held policies of Middle Eastern countries around Palestinian statehood.
Donald Trump’s proposal for US ownership of the Gaza Strip, and the associated displacement of Palestinians to Egypt and Jordan, has opened discussions over the future of Gaza. While the measures remain unclear and may not come to fruition in the form currently presented, Egypt and Jordan will play a pivotal role in any scenario. Neither country, however, is in a position to accept vast numbers of Palestinian refugees. For Jordan, such a move would be deeply unpopular amongst its public, and would likely lead to civil unrest and political instability, while for Egypt, a mass resettlement would destabilise a historically fragile security environment in the Sinai Peninsula.
Security in Egypt
Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, one of the proposed locations for resettling Palestinians from Gaza, is not only a strategic geographic territory – mineral-rich and a buffer between Egypt and Israel – but is also a sensitive region with its own set of security challenges. North Sinai Governorate in particular has endured decades of underdevelopment and high levels of poverty, comparative to the rest of the country, which has left it vulnerable to extremism in the form of the Islamic State offshoot, Wilayat Sinai. Egyptian security forces have made tangible progress in stemming the insurgency in recent years. However, an influx of refugees on the scale proposed by the US and Israel would exacerbate longstanding socio-economic difficulties in the region, and create a conducive recruitment environment for new and existing extremist groups. With this threat to Egypt’s national security, and consequent opposition from the military – compounded by widespread public support for the Palestinian cause – Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi is unlikely to approve a large-scale resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza. This refusal has led to the US seeking other means of engaging Egypt.
Egypt’s economy has been under significant strain for several years. Regional conflict and instability – in Sudan, Libya, Gaza and Yemen – has disrupted key trade routes for Egypt, vastly reduced its revenue from international trade through the Suez Canal, and discouraged foreign tourist arrivals; all critical sources of foreign currency for the country. Regional wars have also driven more than 900,000 registered refugees and asylum seekers to Egypt, the majority from Sudan and Syria. Many millions more migrants have likely not registered for refugee status with the UN Refugee Agency. While Egypt receives international aid in support of its refugees, this high number has nevertheless placed strain on the country’s housing, education, and healthcare sectors.
Egypt can ill afford either a vast influx of Palestinian refugees, or substantial cuts in foreign aid.’’
Meanwhile, for the US and the West, Egypt is a strategic security partner in the Middle East, providing safe haven for hundreds of thousands of refugees, and cooperation against regional Islamist extremist groups. The US may therefore bring Egypt closer in line with its plans through economic inducements. Egypt for its part, may look to diversify its foreign military and economic support, seeking aid and stronger trade ties with Gulf countries, China, and Russia.
Social unrest in Jordan
For Jordan, the displacement of potentially millions of Palestinians is a deeply contentious political and social issue. Jordan has historically accepted hundreds of thousands of Palestinians during previous conflicts, and today, the UN estimates that Jordan already hosts almost 2.4 million Palestinian refugees, although this is likely a vast underestimation. Repeated displacement, and refugees’ inability to return, have created longstanding tensions over Jordanian identity, and widespread public opposition to Israeli policies. Politically, Israel’s actions in Gaza and the West Bank, and the prospect of yet more movement of people, has placed increased scrutiny on Jordanian-Israeli diplomatic ties, and resulted in significant gains by hardline Islamist political groups in the September 2024 parliamentary election. While such a win is unlikely to challenge the political power of King Abdullah II, with whom most of the country’s governance is concentrated, it highlights a growing discontent with the Jordanian government’s attempt to balance domestic political and social dynamics with US and Israeli economic ties.
Like Egypt, Jordan has close economic ties to the US. More than 40 percent of Jordan’s annual foreign aid comes from the US, funnelled into treasury support, modernisation and development projects (particularly in water, sanitation, healthcare and education), and defence. Any cuts will have far-reaching ramifications for Jordan’s social programmes, employment, and economic stability. This will further challenge Jordan in a scenario in which Trump’s proposed plan for Gaza is implemented, with a likely resultant rise in security challenges, from large-scale pro-Palestine protests, to extremist attacks against Israeli citizens and assets.
In efforts to avoid both scenarios and preserve the country’s social and economic stability, King Abdullah II has taken a negotiated approach with the US administration, standing by his country’s support for Palestinian statehood, while agreeing to accept 2,000 children requiring medical treatment from Gaza.
Refugees and US foreign assistance in Egypt and Jordan
Sources: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, US Department of State and US Agency for International Development
Implications of geopolitical pressure
The landmark Hamas-Israel ceasefire on 19 January was never going to resolve the decades long conflict over Gaza and the Palestinian Territories. President Trump’s plans for Gaza have brought sentiments previously restricted to right-wing Israeli groups into common discourse, and this shift in popular and diplomatic debate will have far-reaching implications across the region. For Egypt and Jordan, by virtue of their geographic positions, the consequences of geopolitical wrangling will be made real, with serious ramifications for their respective domestic security, economic, and political environments.
