With Islamist militant groups and extremists carrying out attacks across multiple regions last year, Richard Gardiner examines some of the main actors involved and explores what may lie ahead in 2025.
Over the past decade, the dynamics of Islamist militant groups have evolved significantly. As Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda faced increased pressure in their traditional Middle Eastern strongholds due to international security efforts, their activities shifted to regions like the Sahel in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Central and South Asia. Meanwhile, the threat in Europe has not diminished, with a resurgence of Islamist extremist activity largely driven by ongoing tensions in the Middle East. As a result, the evolving threat from various Islamist militant actors remains a major concern, which should not be underestimated by national governments, security agencies, and business leaders in sectors that continue to be attractive targets.
Significant Islamist militant and extremist attacks in 2024
Under siege: Islamist militants in the Sahel
In 2024, Islamist insurgencies have continued to affect several parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, including Somalia, northern Mozambique, and the Lake Chad Basin. Reported attacks by Islamist militant groups have tripled in the past decade in the Sahel. This surge in militant activity associated with these insurgencies has largely been driven by groups such as Al Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) in the Sahelian states of Mali, Burkina Faso, and, to a lesser extent, Niger. These groups are now well-established and have expanded their territorial control, with over 50 percent of Burkinabe territory under the dominance of various Islamist militant factions. This territorial control, combined with the states’ lack of counter-terrorism capabilities, has provided a base for sustained attacks on civilian populations and commercial interests, such as international mining companies.
The outlook for 2025 is unlikely to herald substantial improvement and instead points to further escalation. Following coups d’état in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the military juntas have severed ties with Western and regional partners, prompting the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers and other foreign forces previously deployed to support counter-terrorism efforts. To fill the gap, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have strengthened relations with Russia, which has included the deployment of mercenaries from Africa Corps, formerly known as Wagner. However, the juntas have failed to place the militants on the backfoot while also lacking the capacity to address the underlying drivers of the insurgencies. Without significant improvements in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities, militant groups are unlikely to face meaningful pressure in their regional strongholds. This will not only allow them to further consolidate their control but also sustain the threat of further expansion into the northern regions of coastal countries like Benin and Togo.
ISKP’s expanding reach
In contrast, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), an offshoot of IS, has come under increasing pressure from the Taliban in its traditional territorial base of Afghanistan over the past two years. However, it has shown remarkable resilience and adaptability and has since increased its transnational footprint and capabilities, underscored by its major attack on a concert venue in Russia in March last year, while also being linked to additional plots and attacks in other Middle Eastern and European countries. ISKP’s international expansion can in large part be attributed to its recruitment and propaganda strategy. Having successfully recruited defectors from Al Qaeda and the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, it has also attracted nationals from Central Asian countries like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, including those working as migrant workers in Russia.
Security and political dynamics within Afghanistan and beyond have created gaps that ISKP can exploit. While the Taliban have made some progress in undermining the group’s domestic capabilities, serious limitations remain in its counter-terrorism strategy. These include a poorly resourced police service and army, a lack of advanced surveillance technology, and a reluctance to increase regulation of the informal banking sector, which continues to be a key source of funding for ISKP. Moreover, despite improved relations between Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, which is partly driven by the latter’s security concerns, there has yet to be a significant boost in regional counter-terrorism efforts to address the ISKP threat.
While ISKP’s territorial base remains in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, its diverse membership and its intent to target traditional enemies of IS, including the West, Russia, and Iran, suggest that the group is likely to make further efforts to increase its transnational footprint in 2025.
European extremists
Tensions in the Middle East have also shaped the Islamist extremist threat in Europe over the past year. The Israel-Palestine conflict has triggered a surge in plots by these actors, reversing the decline observed between 2020 and 2022. The increase includes activity from groups like ISKP, as well as self-radicalised individuals pledging allegiance to such organisations. Although there has been a rise in planned attacks, most have been thwarted due to Europe’s enhanced counter-terrorism capabilities. For example, three people who pledged allegiance to IS were arrested in August 2024 for plotting an attack on a Taylor Swift music concert in Vienna, which allegedly would have included suicide attacks with knives and explosives, likely causing significant casualties. The US reportedly shared intelligence with their Austrian counterparts, which points to the sustained collaboration between Western intelligence agencies and the use of advanced surveillance technologies. This has proven effective in disrupting sophisticated plots by transnational groups.
Consequently, while large-scale attacks in Europe are less likely due to enhanced intelligence and security measures, lone-actor attacks using rudimentary methods, such as stabbings and vehicle ramming, remain a concern.’’
Although these attacks typically result in fewer casualties, they are still highly disruptive, and their indiscriminate and individualistic nature poses considerable challenges for security services in preventing them. While the Israel-Palestine conflict continues, groups like IS are likely to continue their calls for followers to target European countries perceived as being pro-Israel, suggesting a sustained threat of lone-actor attacks across the continent in 2025.
The events industry under threat
The attack on a music concert venue in Moscow Oblast, Russia, which killed over 130 people in March 2024, and the thwarted plot targeting a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna, Austria, in August highlight that high-profile events with large audiences remain attractive targets for Islamist extremists and militant groups. Music concerts and similar events have been consistently targeted in Europe over the past decade, including the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing, which killed 23 people and more than 1,000 injured. In response, police, intelligence agencies, and private security contractors have increasingly started implementing robust measures, such as more rigorous search procedures at event entrances and ensuring adequate staffing levels with personnel trained in counter-terrorism.
