There is a growing ambition among middle power countries to chart their own course in global affairs. Turkey’s reported bid to become the first NATO member to join the BRICS alliance is just the latest example. With this trend set to continue in the coming years, governments and multinational companies alike should prepare to navigate the nuances and complexities of the rise of middle powers.
Turkey’s reported bid to join the BRICS alliance has raised eyebrows in Western capitals, as Ankara seeks to become the first NATO member to join the group. With Turkey’s application process now underway, its acceptance into BRICS – a coalition of emerging economies that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and more recently Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates – would mark the culmination of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s long-standing interest in joining the bloc. And while the move wouldn’t contravene any NATO rules, it would arguably move Turkey closer to some of the traditional adversaries of the military alliance, perhaps most notably Russia. That said, Ankara’s BRICS aspirations rather signal its pursuit of an increasingly diverse and pragmatic foreign policy. This approach of having a foot in different camps has become popular among so-called ‘middle powers’ as they seek to establish their position in the global pecking order and navigate the challenges and opportunities of an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.
Ankara’s BRICS aspirations rather signal its pursuit of an increasingly diverse and pragmatic foreign policy. This approach of having a foot in different camps has become popular among so-called ‘middle powers’ as they seek to establish their position in the global pecking order”
Middle powers, a mix of both democratic and authoritarian countries that lack the global influence of states like China and the US but still wield significant power, are growing in confidence, assertiveness, and independence. This trend can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, they are becoming powerful economic players – by 2030, the combined purchasing power of Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, and South Africa, for example, is projected to equal that of Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Concurrently, the decline of US hegemony has left opportunities for countries to exert their authority in regions where the US was once dominant, including in parts of the Middle East and Africa. Many middle powers have also grown distrustful of multilateral institutions that seem to be dominated by the agenda of only a handful of countries. With the growing emphasis of national interests over international norms as the driver of foreign policy, middle powers have sought to leverage smaller like-minded coalitions or alliances, such as BRICS to achieve their specific objectives, rather than rely on larger multinational bodies like the IMF. Lastly, many middle powers have been slow to pick sides amid growing geopolitical tensions driven by various issues, including the Russia-Ukraine war, instead adopting a pragmatic approach of multi-alignment to best serve their national interests.
Many middle powers have also grown distrustful of multilateral institutions that seem to be dominated by the agenda of only a handful of countries.”
South Africa, for example, has firmly condemned Israel’s use of force in Gaza, but proclaimed neutrality over Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. India, similarly, has prioritised its strategic autonomy by engaging with multiple partners based on its own interests rather than aligning exclusively with any one power bloc. It remains a core member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the US, Japan, and Australia, yet continues to purchase Russian oil despite Western sanctions, while also seeking to position itself as a leader of the Global South. Similarly, Ankara’s bid to join BRICS comes amid frozen EU accession negotiations and ongoing democratic backsliding, all while continuing to benefit from NATO’s security umbrella. But these new rules of engagement – prioritising interests over values – is hardly the sole prerogative of middle powers.
While the administrations of middle powers may have a clear understanding of their strategies, the nuances of their foreign policies create both challenges and opportunities for foreign companies operating in these jurisdictions. In some cases, these countries are striving to make their mark by opening up their economies and positioning themselves as hubs for investment and commerce. For example, Saudi Arabia has implemented significant regulatory reforms in recent years to attract foreign investment, aiming to establish itself as the regional economic powerhouse amid its rivalry with the UAE and the need to grow its non-oil sector. However, the balancing act of some middle powers and their strategic approach of multi-alignment can generate significant uncertainty for companies. South Africa, for instance, continues to be a hub for Western investors in Sub-Saharan Africa, yet it has refused to cut ties with Russia despite the ongoing war in Ukraine. Alarm bells rang in 2023 over concerns about potential US sanctions against South Africa after the US alleged that South Africa had provided weapons to Russia in violation of US, UK, EU, and other arms embargoes against Russia. While South Africa and the US resolved the dispute, the issue underscores the need for foreign companies to be keenly aware of any ambiguous aspects of a country’s foreign policy that could have future repercussions in the jurisdiction where they operate.
The balancing act of some middle powers and their strategic approach of multi-alignment can generate significant uncertainty for companies.”
As middle powers increasingly strive to establish themselves as influential and autonomous players on the global stage, Turkey’s bid to join BRICS comes as no surprise. Governments, particularly those in the traditional centres of power in the North America and Europe, will need to come to terms with this reality, and so will multinational companies. In addition to navigating growing geopolitical volatility, these governments and enterprises will need to be on the lookout for the risks and opportunities that the manoeuvring of the middle powers present. Interests are more changeable than norms, and this volatility can limit the predictability of political risk. But for nimble actors that closely track the political winds and can exploit potential market turbulence triggered by the geostrategic positioning of middle powers, these shifts in can equally create new growth opportunities.