Tamsin Hunt examines developments in conflict hotspots in Ukraine, the Middle East and Sudan, assessing prospects for peace, and the potential regional repercussions of drawn-out instability.
Three of the world’s largest conflicts, Ukraine, the Middle East and Sudan, have been ongoing for more than a year – nearing on three, in the case of Ukraine. These wars have had devastating effects in each region, with growing concern over the apparent lack of momentum towards lasting peace.
Casualties of war: Estimated figures as of November 2024
Conflict in the Middle East
In November 2024, talks towards a truce between Israel and Hezbollah finally progressed, culminating in a two-month ceasefire agreement in Lebanon. This marked a notable de-escalation after more than a year of conflict in the Middle East, characterised by a deepening crisis in Gaza, expanding offensives in Lebanon, and missile exchanges between Israel and Iran, which brought the region to the brink of war in April 2024, and again in October.
However, the agreement was built on shaky ground, with signs of strain immediately visible in the repeated violations on both sides. Parts of the deal were reminiscent of the peace agreement that followed the 2006 Lebanon War – mandating Hezbollah’s disarmament and withdrawal from Lebanese territory south of the Litani River – which patently failed to find a lasting solution to the intermittent conflict that followed. Additionally, Israel is preparing for a long war in the Gaza Strip – or at minimum a protracted presence, with largescale construction and bulldozing of buffer zones already underway, and a national budget aimed at funding the country’s defence spending. Israel’s ongoing offensive in Gaza will provide continued incentive for regional state and non-state groups to attack Israel, not least Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, and Iran, Israel’s longstanding rival.
Israel is preparing for a long war in the Gaza Strip – or at minimum a protracted presence.’’
Middle Eastern (in)stability
While tensions remain high, the threat of further conflict will continue to dominate Middle Eastern stability over the coming year. Internal displacement will place pressure on Lebanon’s resources, already strained by years of political and economic instability, while Israel’s public will bear the burden of increased taxes to fund the country’s defence budget. In Gaza, civilians will face a deepening humanitarian catastrophe over the coming months. Looking further afield, Egypt, having narrowly avoided a default on its sovereign debt repayments in 2024, will continue to find its revenues from Suez Canal trade dampened by lower risk appetite amongst global shippers. And member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, will likely continue to operate on the sidelines, leveraging diplomatic channels to contain the fighting in efforts to preserve their own economic ambitions.
The Russia-Ukraine War
After years of grinding advances along the frontlines, both Ukraine and Russia face new challenges in 2025, from defence funding limitations and economic strain, to shifts in support from international allies, driving significant uncertainty in the trajectory of the war in 2025.
Amid concerns over withdrawals of US funding assistance, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s reliance on US weapons could open a void in Ukraine’s military reserves unlikely to be filled by other Western allies. Ukraine is also battling personnel shortages where Russia has won some notable advances in recent months. For Russia, its battleground successes have come at a cost. One-third of Russia’s state expenditure goes towards defence, with spending due to increase by a further 25 percent in 2025. Although Russia’s economy has shown resilience since its invasion in February 2022, the expense of conflict is unsustainable. Western sanctions targeting its financial system and energy exports have done significant damage, with the rouble dropping a further eight percent in November. Additionally, Russia’s wartime economy is driving living prices upwards, forcing its central bank to raise interest rates to 21 percent in efforts to control inflation. US President-elect Donald Trump has signalled intent to draw both parties to the negotiating table in the coming months, and Zelenskyy has indicated a willingness to work with Trump on a peace deal. However, much remains uncertain around the prospects for such a deal, including what both Ukraine and Russia are prepared to concede – particularly with Russia potentially unwilling to surrender its current momentum.
Europe’s compounding challenges
Three years of war in Ukraine have left the continent deeply changed. For the European Union, delinking energy, supply chains and other business interests from Russia drove high inflation and an energy crisis in 2022, while military capabilities have risen in priority for political and budgetary agendas in several member states. Meanwhile, some Eastern European countries – such as Georgia and Moldova – are increasingly caught between maintaining their ties with the EU, and their business interests in Russia. In some countries like Georgia, polarised public opinion between pro-EU and pro-Russia factions have led to social tensions, contested elections and claims of external interference, adding the burden of political instability to existing security and economic concerns.
Civil war in Sudan
Sudan’s civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) – the country’s official military – and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group has largely stagnated, and the likelihood of a ceasefire in the coming months is remote. The SAF has retaken lost territory in critical areas around the capital, Khartoum, and regained control of the strategic Jebel Moya region. But the RSF, although weakened, continues its protracted offensive in Darfur. Dynamics in Darfur’s capital city, El Fasher, illustrates the deepening deadlock; the city has been under siege since May 2024, creating dire humanitarian conditions for its 800,000 residents often caught in the cross-fire.
Neither side appears willing to engage in peace talks, with each propped up by arms and aid from international stakeholders – just enough to fund the fight, but not enough to make a substantive breakthrough. Any peace process will be further complicated by the multitude of decentralised tribal groups that have pledged allegiance to one side or another. Simultaneously maintaining their own territorial and governance ambitions, these groups will likely demand a seat at the negotiating table.
A bleak outlook for Northeast Africa
Already considered to be the worst displacement disaster globally, three million people have left Sudan. According to UN statistics, 40 percent of Sudanese refugees have sought refuge in Egypt; more than 700,000 in Chad; 190,000 in South Sudan; 180,000 in Libya; and tens of thousands more in Uganda and Ethiopia. With the war set to continue into 2025, Sudan’s humanitarian environment will deteriorate further, and rising displacement will place pressure on host countries’ already strained resources and infrastructure, further stretched by chronic shortfalls in international funding. Meanwhile, weapons’ flows through the region will continue, perpetuated by external powers’ support to local factions as they seek to further their agendas by proxy. In this context, refugee flows and arms trafficking will sustain security risks for neighbouring countries already weakened by their own armed insurgencies and inter-state tensions, such as Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan.
