Tamsin Hunt examines the immediate security implications for foreign and local nationals in Lebanon and Israel should the increasing aggression between Israel and Hezbollah devolve into open conflict.
The situation on the Israel-Lebanon border has undoubtedly deteriorated in recent weeks, raising fears that Israel and Hezbollah may soon go to war. With Israel ramping up its targeted attacks on senior Hezbollah personnel, and Hezbollah returning fire with increasing numbers of rockets and missiles launched towards Israel, both sides are pushing the boundaries of military engagement, risking a disproportionate response by either player that may lead to open conflict. As a case in point, the fallout from the attack that killed 12 minors in the Golan Heights on 27 July – strongly suspected to have been launched by Hezbollah – will only serve to inch both sides closer to that red line.
A full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah promises to be significant in scale and destruction for both countries. Both sides have sufficient military capabilities to inflict far more damage than their last major clash in 2006, and open warfare has the potential to draw international allies into the fray; Iran – and Iranian-funded regional militant groups – on the side of Hezbollah, and the US in support of Israel. With temperatures rising, multiple international airlines have already suspended flights through Beirut in July 2024, and the UK and Canadian governments now advise against all travel to the country.
Strategic strikes in Lebanon
If Israel and Hezbollah were to go to war, Israel’s strikes on Lebanon would likely be immediate, targeted and far-reaching, with particularly devastating consequences for the country’s transport, logistics and civilian infrastructure. While the Lebanon War of 2006 took place under vastly different circumstances – both in terms of Hezbollah’s military capabilities and Lebanon’s political and economic environment at the time – it does hint at what Israel’s strategy may look like next time around. As in 2006, Israel would likely launch quick-fire missile attacks on Beirut International Airport, blockade Lebanon’s ports, and bomb strategic roads and bridges across the country to disrupt Hezbollah’s supply lines. In addition, with Hezbollah’s weaponry and fighter cells embedded in tunnels and mountainous regions, out of reach of Israeli air strikes, Israel would likely target critical infrastructure close to civilian areas, which in turn could erode Hezbollah’s popular support. Such attacks would drive largescale displacement as civilians flee conflict zones; they would complicate international evacuation efforts; and place severe strain on the country’s already limited resources to provide the necessary food, fuel and humanitarian aid to affected communities.
International evacuations from Lebanon in 2006:
By sea
Thousands of foreign nationals were evacuated to Cyprus on military ships and contracted commercial vessels. The US evacuated 15,000 US nationals; the UK evacuated 2,500 citizens; and an Italian ship evacuated 366 European nationals.
By air
The US evacuated small numbers of US nationals by helicopter from Beirut.
By road
Syria reported that 75,000 foreign nationals crossed its border from Lebanon in the first five days of conflict, after Israel bombed Beirut International Airport. Spain, for example, transported 100 citizens by road to Syria, where they were met by a military plane in Damascus.
Wholesale assault on Israel
For its part, Hezbollah would return fire on Israel, deploying thousands of short, intermediate and long-range missiles. Although estimates vary, Hezbollah is believed to have stockpiled between 120,000 and 200,000 missiles. For scale, Hezbollah has only fired approximately 5,000 projectiles towards Israel over the nine months between October 2023 and June 2024, amounting to only 2.5 percent of its potential arsenal.
Israel’s air defence system – known as the ‘Iron Dome’ – is sophisticated and effective, with its success rate of intercepting hostile rocket attacks often exceeding 90 percent, according to data from the Israel Defense Forces. But, 10 percent of hundreds of thousands of rockets is still a lot of successful fire power, with the potential damage to Israel’s urban centres being substantial. Hezbollah would also target critical infrastructure, including transport networks, communication channels, supply lines and the power grid; and internal displacement – which, at present, is concentrated in northern Israel – would spread to other parts of the country as Hezbollah deploys longer range weapons. Looking to Hamas’s October 2023 attack as precedent, international airlines would likely suspend flights to and from Ben Gurion Airport, and many countries would take steps to evacuate their citizens to safety.
On the brink
There are many reasons for Israel and Hezbollah not to go to war. For Israel, it would open a second front for its military, already under strain from months of heavy fighting in Gaza, and it would risk provoking an even stronger response from opponents in Iran. Meanwhile for Hezbollah, a militant group that has expanded into the political and social governance sphere of Lebanon, pushing the country to war would negatively impact its popular support, particularly outside its traditional Shi’a support bases.
Both sides, however, remain intent on pursuing this conflict; Hezbollah in support of its ally in Gaza, Hamas, and Israel in defence of its northern border. Diplomatic pressure from regional and global powers has seen some success in preventing the conflict from spreading beyond its current tit-for-tat exchanges. Nevertheless, Hezbollah and Israel appear to be fast approaching an escalation that could cause largescale destruction and disruption in both Israel and Lebanon, with the consequences of war falling hardest – as always – on civilians.
