As a Kenyan-led multinational mission enters Haiti to support local police in combatting gang violence, Erin Drake considers what such a mission can realistically achieve amid a host of challenges, including seemingly poor planning, funding uncertainty, and a legacy of failed intervention – not to mention the potential fallout of clashes in densely-populated areas.
Haiti continued to experience political turbulence and gang-related instability in 2024, resulting in former Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s resignation in March, and the creation of a temporary government led by Interim Prime Minister Garry Conille. The interim government now looks to tackle Haiti’s most immediate crisis, as violent gangs grip the country and control 80 percent of its capital, Port-au-Prince. Broadly aimed at regaining control over key infrastructure, like the Port-au-Prince seaport through which most humanitarian aid flows, the government has proceeded with plans laid out in 2022 for hosting a Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support mission. 200 Kenyan police have already deployed, although the force is eventually set to comprise 2,500 personnel, including 1,000 police from Kenya, and various personnel from Africa, the Caribbean, France, the UK, and other countries. It will bolster capabilities of Haitian police, who have neither the training nor the resources to contain powerful gangs equipped with sophisticated weaponry and significant numbers.
However, the mission faces challenges that could frustrate progress; a slow start amid domestic pushback in Kenya, international reluctance to fund the endeavour, and emerging operational shortcomings cast doubt on its potential longevity, while the sheer number of gangs drives potential for violent confrontations. This has raised concerns not only around whether the remaining police will be deployed, but also whether they can be effective once they are.
Commitment issues
The deployment has faced legal setbacks in Kenya, including a High Court ruling declaring it unconstitutional, and a challenge filed in May 2024 seeking to dispense with the mission, threatening the future of the remaining deployment. There are also signs of early resourcing and logistical challenges. The initial deployment was delayed after Kenyan officials arrived in Port-au-Prince to discover shortages of key equipment, like armoured vehicles and weapons, and senior officials have claimed that further work is needed before more troops can deploy. Much also remains unclear about the mission’s mandate, including who is responsible for coordination efforts. Haiti’s transitional presidential council is required to create a security council to oversee international support, including the extent of foreign police integration with Haitian forces, although this has not yet materialised.
UN member states have been reluctant to contribute funding towards the mission, estimated to need over USD 670 million. The US – its main backer – has pledged over USD 110 million in logistical and material support. However, given the substantial resources required to equip and house foreign troops for 12 months, funding shortages could generate significant setbacks to the mission’s ability to function effectively.
On a knife’s edge
Questions have circulated around how a small deployment would fare against thousands (12,000 according to Conille) of well-armed gang members. However, having flourished under conditions of near impunity against hamstrung police, gangs may not be as well prepared for a more organised security operation. This sentiment is perhaps reflected in powerful gang leader Jimmy Chérizier’s latest offer for his loose coalition of gangs to lay down arms in favour of dialogue with the government. Conille has welcomed this, although Chérizier’s sincerity is unclear, preceded days earlier by a declaration of war against foreign forces as Kenya’s first contingent arrived. The potential for violent escalations remains amid heightened tensions, especially if Chérizier’s conditions for dialogue are rejected. And, not all gangs will opt for a strategy of dialogue and disarmament, further maintaining potential for clashes and associated civilian casualties in populated areas like Port-au-Prince in the coming months.
Having flourished under conditions of near impunity against hamstrung police, gangs may not be as well prepared for a more organised security operation”
A sceptical population
While many locals have welcomed the mission, others, including international observers, are wary of the potential for another peacekeeping operation with catastrophic consequences. A UN mission in 2004 to assist following a coup and flooding faced widespread local resistance, withdrawing in 2017 amid reports of sexual abuse by UN staff, and accusations (later confirmed) that poor sanitation at a UN camp introduced a cholera epidemic, for which the UN formally apologised. Criticism further centres on suspicions that the foreign deployment would be coopted to prop up an unelected government or be used by Kenya to curry favour with the US. Anger flared on local news and social media after Kenyan troops were shown stationed at the US embassy, sparking accusations that the mission is prioritising foreign personnel over its mandate.
Meanwhile, the UN’s lack of direct oversight over the mission’s implementation may limit accountability structures, elevating potential for misconduct. Concerns are amplified due to prevalent corruption among Kenyan police, and a tendency to crack down violently on unrest back home. Any perceived wrongdoing – from poor performance on strategic goals, to harassment or force against civilians – could strip tentative community and international support for the operation, driving potential for unrest and further funding hesitancy.
An uncertain future
Challenges facing the deployment suggest that substantial improvements to the security environment may take longer than its 12-month mandate to materialise, although there is no clear plan for what happens next. Without substantial funding and political will to extend the mission’s mandate, or to ensure that Haitian police capabilities are substantially improved, it is unlikely that local police can sustain anti-gang efforts. The mission’s continuation will also largely be subject to developments on the political front. Political stability remains fragile, and further infighting – particularly ahead of and following elections tentatively scheduled for August 2025 – could derail cooperation required to negotiate an extended mission.
Despite current and longer-term challenges, if the Kenyan-led mission can support even incremental improvements, like ensuring the functioning of humanitarian operations and critical infrastructure to secure food and fuel imports, perhaps Haiti can begin moving towards a more permissive environment for elections, governance, and stability.
