Slowly but surely, Ukraine is weakening Russia’s hold on Crimea, bolstered by the recent deployment of advanced long-range Western weapons systems. Richard Gardiner argues that while this will not secure a decisive victory for Ukraine in the war, it will still have significant implications for Russia, which has always viewed Crimea as a critical linchpin for its regional objectives.
In recent months, Ukraine has intensified its attacks on a range of military targets in Crimea, including naval assets, airfields, and air defence systems. Despite Ukraine facing equipment and personnel shortages and making little progress on the frontlines in eastern and southern Ukraine, the targeting of the Crimean Peninsula has yielded significant results, threatening Russia’s dominant position there. While a Ukrainian amphibious offensive to recapture Crimea remains out of the question, the approach of isolating the peninsula is beginning to reduce its strategic value and render it more of a liability than an asset to Russia.
Crimea: Russia’s prized possession
Having been part of Russia for over two centuries until 1954, the Kremlin has always been acutely aware of the strategic and symbolic importance of Crimea. President Vladimir Putin has previously dubbed it an unsinkable aircraft carrier and Russia’s annexation of the peninsula in 2014 showed how far Putin was willing to go to ensure that Crimea would not fall into the hands of an increasingly anti-Russian government in Kyiv. Since then, Russia gained full control of the Black Sea Fleet’s home base in Sevastopol, which had been leased from Ukraine, and immediately invested millions of dollars in Crimea’s military infrastructure. From Putin’s perspective, his decision to annex the territory was more than vindicated in February 2022, when Crimea proved its worth, serving as a launchpad for Russian forces to begin the invasion of southern Ukraine, allowing the Black Sea Fleet to blockade Ukraine’s coastline, and enabling Russian aircraft to carry out numerous long-range airstrikes from the peninsula’s airfields.
Ukraine tightens its grip
Recognising Crimea's importance to Russia, Ukraine has launched a multi-pronged strategy involving airstrikes, naval drone attacks, and special forces sabotage against the territory. Over the past two years, Ukraine has sunk or damaged at least a third of the Black Sea Fleet including its flagship, the Moskva, in April 2022. This forced Russia's navy to relocate the fleet to the port of Novorossiysk, which has also faced sporadic Ukrainian attacks in recent months. The introduction of Western weapon systems has also proved pivotal. British and French Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles, and more recently US ATACMS ballistic missiles, can strike the entire peninsula while evading Russian air defence systems stationed in the region. This has enabled Ukraine to conduct precision strikes across Crimea, targeting locations like Belbek airfield, where they have destroyed multiple aircraft and several advanced S-400 air defence systems.
Ukraine’s current Crimean strategy will not necessarily win them the war, but by slowly constricting Crimea, it prevents Russia from targeting Ukraine’s soft underbelly. The peninsula’s value as a logistics hub has diminished somewhat since 2022. Russia has established a land bridge in southern Ukraine, linking the occupied territories in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts with Russia. Additionally, Russian engineers are nearing the completion of a railway from the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don through the occupied southern Ukrainian territory. This new line offers an alternative route to resupply Russian troops in southern Ukraine following the closure of the old line due to fighting near Donetsk. Thus, even if Russia loses access to Crimea, it could continue its war in southern and eastern Ukraine. However, the coordinated campaign of striking Russian military targets and critical infrastructure has the potential to make Russia’s military position in Crimea untenable, reducing its importance in other areas.
Russia’s Crimea connections
What is at stake?
Ukraine’s approach has already started to bite. Firstly, the relocation of the Black Sea Fleet has severely curtailed Russia’s ability to assert its naval dominance in the region, launch future amphibious assaults on southwestern Ukraine and threaten Ukrainian grain shipments, which have now returned to pre-2022 levels and form an economic lifeline for Ukraine, despite the collapse of the Black Sea Grain initiative in 2023. Secondly, degrading Russia’s air defence systems in Crimea could prove influential once Western-supplied F-16 jets are available to the Ukrainian air force. In combination with continued strikes deep inside the peninsula, increased control of Crimea’s airspace would make it increasingly difficult for Russia to use Crimea as a staging area for a potential large-scale attack on southern Ukraine.
Reducing Russia’s superiority in Crimea would also prove an effective tactic for Kyiv in gaining leverage over the Kremlin in any ceasefire negotiations. There is unlikely to be a significant shift in the positions of the frontlines in eastern or southern Ukraine for the foreseeable future, with neither side having gained a strategic breakthrough since Ukraine’s success in Kharkiv and Kherson at the end of 2022. Nevertheless, that still means Russia controls swathes of territory in Ukraine, automatically giving them the upper hand in future peace talks. However, Ukraine’s success in Crimea would help to neutralise Russia’s advantage. Lastly, the sustained attacks on Crimea have now driven away Russian tourists, who are an important revenue source for the peninsula, forcing the Kremlin to sink further financial resources to the area to sustain its economy.
From asset to liability
The success of Ukraine’s strategy in Crimea so far suggests it has developed a formula that can neutralise its importance to Russia while avoiding the need to commit valuable personnel to an offensive to retake the peninsula that it cannot afford. As a result, its campaign of drone and missile strikes, as well as sabotage, will continue and potentially intensify if Ukraine can bring enough Western aircraft into service over the next 12 months. They will likely try to destroy the Kerch Strait bridge, forcing Russia to resupply Crimea through road and rail links in occupied southern Ukraine, which will likely face increased attacks too. Despite these promising signs, for Ukraine to fulfil its Crimean objectives, it will still depend on prolonged Western support. Ukraine has shown ingenuity in its use of domestically produced drones and anti-ship missiles to devastate Russia's Black Sea Fleet. However, these measures alone are insufficient and must be complemented by a steady supply of Western weapon systems. With this support, this key stronghold could ultimately become a major liability for Russia.
