In September 2024, three of the sixteen German federal states held parliamentary elections. Already in the lead up to the state elections, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Germany’s right wing populist party, seemed set to win a large share of the votes. This prompted established parties – including the centre-right Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU), which has governed Germany for the majority of the time since World War II and the reunification – to reassure their voters that a coalition with the AfD would not be considered.
Despite this promise, the practical reality of this outcome is clear; with more than 30 percent of the votes in both Sachsen and Thüringen, and a close 29.2 percent in Brandenburg, the AfD will have significant influence on the political landscapes in these states even if it does not enter government – and the pressure for deciding on coalitions is mounting. But these elections not only determine the makeup of legislative authorities in those states for the next five years – they also serve as a political barometer in East Germany ahead of the country’s general elections in 2025.
“The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) will have significant influence on the political landscapes in [Sachsen, Thüringen, and Brandenburg] even if it does not enter government – and the pressure for deciding on coalitions is mounting”
The elections saw significant gains for parties on the further ends of the political spectrum, and heavy losses for parties in the ruling coalition (the Sozial Demokratisch Partei, die Grünen, and the Freie Demokratische Partei). In Thüringen, the CDU received 23.6 percent of the votes, and the newly founded Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW), a populist splinter party of die Linke, gained 15.8 percent in its maiden election. However, the AfD won the largest share of the votes with 32.8 percent. Meanwhile, in Sachsen, the AfD gained 30.6 percent of the vote and is ranked just behind the CDU with 31.9 percent, and in Brandenburg, the SPD narrowly clung to power with 30.9 percent.
The idea of coalitions with the AfD has prompted unease, with the CDU and other parties reluctant to enter talks with the party – after all, the AfD’s Thürigner branch and their leader Björn Höcke were designated “right wing extremist” in 2021 by Thüringen’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Even Chancellor Olaf Scholz encouraged parties to band together to form a ‘political firewall,’ preventing the AfD from entering state governments.
But the results present the CDU with limited options in each state, aside from the AfD. The party has previously proclaimed that it would never form a coalition with die Linke, and as the BSW is an even more left-wing version of die Linke, it does not immediately look like there is any common ground. Nevertheless, an option excluding the AfD sees the CDU facing a tri-party coalition with die Linke and the BSW in Thüringen, and another triple coalition consisting of CDU, BSW, and SPD in Sachsen. Meanwhile, in Brandenburg, possible coalitions could include either the SPD, BSW, and CDU, or an SPD and BSW grouping. However, since the CDU proclaimed in late September that they did not want to continue coalition talks with the SPD, there is only one alternative option – SPD-BSW – which excludes the AfD. As such, the BSW – which touts a left-leaning economic policy, with an anti-immigration agenda and a demand for ceasing arms shipments to Ukraine – looks set to play a critical role in coalition negotiations in the region.
These elections highlight the growing struggle in East Germany and the wider country to accommodate – or counter – the AfD’s growing popularity. The pressure to form coalitions comprising potentially uncomfortable partnerships will likely result in somewhat unstable party politics, and a struggle to reach consensus on critical state-level policies like law enforcement, education and local court appointments. While the parties do show some commitment to finding common ground, they face not only internal divisions on how to accomplish this given significant differences in their values, history, political track records and policies – including how to manage immigration, the economy, social security and Germany’s relationship with Russia – but also external pressures from their electorate, who may grow increasingly disaffected should political deadlocks prevent meaningful progress in the aforementioned areas.
Even if they avoid a coalition with the AfD, the party’s increasing strength in the political sphere will continue to take a social and economic toll in East Germany. There are growing concerns over what this will mean for the region’s economy, particularly if skilled workers look to leave the region in light of rising anti-foreigner sentiment. Businesses have also indicated concern over what this climate of hostility means for the political risk landscape, including potential violence, unrest and the loss of labour, with some indicating plans to move operations to Berlin. Many also fear for the safety and future of minority groups.
While on a local level these elections primarily impact a small selection of the states within Germany, it is important to recognise the power each state holds on a federal level. At a national level, each state has the potential to influence certain policies through the Bundesrat, Germany’s upper legislative house, in which Thürigen, Sachsen, and Brandenburg each have four seats. This now gives far-left and far-right parties the opportunity to influence German legislation, if not directly, then by proxy. And since the AfD obtained a blocking minority (or the so called “Sperrminorität”) in Thüringen and Brandenburg, which allows them to veto decisions in the state government requiring a two-thirds majority, they can indirectly influence a Bundesrat vote even from an oppositional position.
While the state elections are over, the general election looms large next year. Alongside the AfD’s growing popularity, these recent elections emphasise the souring mood towards the incumbent national government, and the issues likely to be at the forefront of the 2025 general election. Anti-immigration sentiment, economic challenges, and internal and social security will remain key areas that may encourage greater support for the party, and in order to remain competitive, the current ruling coalition can no longer rely on its previous momentum or its current performance. It will need to adapt to retain existing supporters, and convince disillusioned young voters (a significant portion of whom voted AfD in the state elections) that it has their interests at heart.
Anti-immigration sentiment, economic challenges, and internal and social security will remain key areas that may encourage greater support for the [AfD] party”
All the parties, perhaps aside from the AfD and BSW, have lessons to learn – particularly the incumbent government parties, who either just made into the three state parliaments, or missed out altogether. As for Germany’s role on the wider EU stage, it is becoming increasingly apparent that its internal political tug-of-war is going to preoccupy much of the country’s attention, possibly turning it further and further away from its established leadership role in the regional bloc. Chancellor Scholz may be proven right in thinking that the rise of right-wing populism could be damaging for Germany’s reputation – particularly as Europe’s democratic powerhouse.
Editor: Erin Drake, Associate, Strategic Intelligence