Amid rapidly escalating violence and unrest Shannon Lorimer and Erin Drake consider the trajectory of Haiti’s political future.
Since 29 February, powerful G9 gang leader Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, allying with other gangs, has exploited Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s absence in Haiti to launch a large-scale, coordinated assault in Port-au-Prince, targeting critical infrastructure and security installations to force Henry’s resignation. Like much of Haiti’s population, gangs have been at odds with Henry’s administration – initially intended to be a temporary installation after former President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination in 2021 – for its lack of perceived legitimacy. While gangs have previously demonstrated significant capabilities to seize infrastructure, disrupt trade, and stoke violent unrest, their latest efforts led by Chérizier look set to drive an even greater deterioration in the failing state and fragile social landscape. With Chérizier vowing imminent “civil war” and “genocide” if Henry fails to resign, and if international actors continue to support the incumbent administration, Haiti stands on the precipice of a gang-led insurrection.
Since end-February, violent clashes between gangs and security forces have resulted in dozens of casualties, disruptions to aid distribution, and a 72-hour state of emergency declared on 3 March, which was extended until 3 April. On 2 March, gang members set two police stations ablaze before launching a coordinated assault on the two biggest prisons in the country, freeing around 4,000 inmates. Over the next few days, gangs opened fire on a police academy, engaged in shootouts with security forces, attempted to seize Toussaint-Louverture International Airport, and briefly held students at a state university hostage. On 7 March, armed groups breached a critical port terminal in Port-au-Prince, looting containers, sabotaging security apparatus, and forcing the port and the World Food Program to suspend aid and transport operations countrywide. Amid escalating violence, governments have urged foreign nationals to evacuate – a feat likely to become increasingly difficult as roads, airports and ports remain ground zero for attacks by gangs and other armed factions.
Despite a December 21 accord adopted by the government and various societal and political stakeholders, which provided for 2023 elections and set Henry’s resignation for 7 February 2024, Henry has resisted domestic and international pressure to establish a transitional administration to pave the way for elections, arguing that improvements in the security situation are necessary before a free and fair vote can occur. Henry’s obstinacy has been propped up by a muted international response, including from the US which has held the line on encouraging a democratic transition led by Henry. However, some accounts suggest that support is faltering; a Caribbean diplomat told a prominent US newspaper that the US State Department allegedly provided Henry with a potential resignation speech during the PM’s (attempted) return to Haiti on 5 March, after a diplomatic trip to Kenya to gather support for a UN-backed deployment of Kenyan police officers to combat escalating violence. The US has denied pushing Henry to step down, but notably also indicated that it will not assist the PM, now stuck in Puerto Rico, in returning to Haiti after the Dominican Republic denied his plane permission to land. With signs that international backers may distance themselves from Henry, it is unclear if this could persuade him to relinquish his already-limited grip on power.
The immediate environment in Port-au-Prince, and likely the rest of the country, will remain characterised by instability and violence as Chérizier and his allies attempt to force Henry out of office. Chérizier likely views the current coalescence of factors – Henry’s absence, the international community’s apparent reluctance to commit to a support mission, and the government’s near-total loss of control over the security, economic and political landscape – as an opportune time to press his agenda. As such, even if Henry secures the requisite political will for an external force to help stem violence and lawlessness, it may already be too late for facilitating stability, particularly with gangs now reportedly in control of large swathes of the country in addition to 80 percent of Port-au-Prince. Should Henry resign, however, the resulting power vacuum would likely drive further violence as gangs jostle for control amid efforts to quickly cobble together an interim government authority.
In a ‘best-case’ scenario, the international community may be able to mediate a compromise – Henry will need to commit to a clear and shortened timeline for establishing a transitional body to lay the groundwork for free and fair elections, concluding with his resignation. But this outcome remains optimistic given the political, budgetary, administrative and logistical challenges in resourcing and facilitating free and fair elections in the midst of what already resembles a civil war. With Haiti’s trajectory unclear, and its leader at loggerheads with powerful gangs and seemingly unable to return home, elections are a rather hopeful but ultimately distant possibility at this stage.