The latest chapter of Syria’s transition following the fall of the Assad regime unfolded with the long-anticipated replacement of the caretaker interim government with a new Syrian government for a five-year transitional period. The “build and change” government is now tasked with rebuilding state institutions and the economy, improving state services and securing international support. Recent developments, such as the UK's decision to unfreeze Syria's central bank assets, signal a potential shift in international engagement with Syria's new administration. However, as Rabiee Ibrahim shares in this article, questions remain about the government’s ability to overcome the key challenges facing Syria and the international and domestic dynamics shaping its future.
New transitional government
On 29 March 2025, current President Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of the dominant Islamist rebel group behind the takeover Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), unveiled Syria’s transitional government, a 23-member cabinet tasked with steering the country through its fragile post-Assad phase. The new government is comprised mostly of technocrats not aligned with HTS and with distributed portfolios among a mix of figures from diverse ethnic and religious communities, including Kurds, Druze, Alawites, and Christians. However, it retained key sovereign ministries in HTS hands such as the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, interior and justice, with no representation from other political groupings. While HTS’s political adversaries remain reserved about its concentration of power, the new government has been broadly perceived, and recognised internationally, as more representative of Syria’s social diversity and more capable than the preceding caretaker government in addressing the country’s vast governance challenges. Nevertheless, local and international confidence will continue to hinge on the new authorities’ curbing of extremist influences and security threats.
International engagement and economic recovery
The post-Assad transition has opened a narrow window for international economic engagement with Syria, but sanctions remain a key obstacle. Since the formation of the previous caretaker government, international responses have varied, with the EU showing cautious optimism and taking more forward-leaning steps, while the US has largely exercised strategic restraint.
While some in Washington have advocated for a phased easing of sanctions, this remains conditional on a set of non-negotiables: dismantling chemical weapons, cooperation on counterterrorism, ousting of foreign militants from the Syrian army, and ensuring inclusive political representation. These demands, deeply rooted in security concerns, are being used as political leverage, stalling the potential for economic relief from encouraging, yet still modest, gestures like the UK’s unfreezing of Syria’s central bank assets and the EU’s recent steps to ease sanctions. Meanwhile, Arab countries have been keen to advance investments and support the new administration, with a recent Qatari gas deal marking a shift toward conditional pragmatism to navigate US restraint in lifting sanctions. The deal is expected to inject up to 400 megawatts into Syria’s strained electricity grid, but its significance lies more in its approval under US sanctions by being designed as an aid grant to qualify for limited humanitarian exemptions, which could set a precedent for further easing of the sanctions landscape.
Internal and external security threats
Furthermore, as Syria navigates its post-Assad phase, internal political dynamics take centre stage. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which signed an agreement with President Ahmed al-Sharaa on 10 March 2025 to integrate its autonomous administration in northeast Syria, has rejected the formation of the new government, citing a lack of adequate representation. However, a recent prisoner exchange indicates that the joint committees tasked with implementing the agreement are making tangible progress. On the other hand, in the south of Syria, the response from the Druze community has been less harsh, though they continue to advocate for greater decentralisation and stronger local governance mechanisms.
Meanwhile, persistent feelings of marginalisation among the Alawite community in the coastal areas have not eased yet to prevent former regime remnants - active locally and along the Lebanese border with suspected backing by Iran - from exploiting these grievances to continue their attacks against security forces.
Compounding these tensions is the increasingly destabilising role of Israel in the south, which has fuelled local resentment and recently escalated into confrontations with armed residents not organised within the new Syrian army. These dynamics have aggravated the risk of an Israeli military escalation with Turkey over the latter’s expanding influence in Syria.
What lies ahead?
The transitional phase in Syria will continue to be marked by a delicate balance of power, both internally and externally. While the new government appears more inclusive and technocratic, its internal legitimacy remains fragile. External actors, on the other hand, ranging from the US to regional powers, continue to influence the trajectory of Syria’s recovery, with uncertainty lingering surrounding the lifting of sanctions and the prospect of genuine political stability.
Four months after the fall of al-Assad, the road ahead for Syria remains fraught with challenges. Ultimately, the ability of the new government to reconcile Syria’s internal divisions and secure meaningful international engagement will determine whether Syria can move toward lasting stability or remain mired in prolonged uncertainty.
