The interim government assumed office amid widespread popular goodwill, although navigating the country’s intricate political and security challenges will likely prove increasingly difficult, writes Saif Islam.
“The country holds immense potential to blossom into a beautiful nation,” remarked Professor Muhammad Yunus before taking over as the leader of Bangladesh’s interim government. The 84-year-old Nobel laureate accepted the role at the behest of student activists, whose anti-government protests culminated in the end of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year rule. On August 5, Hasina fled the country after weeks of protests against the government’s job quota escalated into mass demonstrations. Protests escalated following a heavy police crackdown that killed more than 200 protesters, mostly students, prompting calls for Hasina’s resignation.
The Yunus-led interim government has tough challenges ahead, including restoring law and order, reforming state institutions, tackling corruption, revitalising the economy, and preparing conditions for free and fair elections. The administration currently enjoys widespread popular support. Yunus has a stellar reputation and there is desire among many Bangladeshis for a new kind of governance – one that is fundamentally different from the bitterly partisan politics of the Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) who took turns in dominating the political landscape since the early 1990s.
However, early developments suggest the interim government faces a precarious journey ahead amid a rise in politically motivated violence, attacks on religious minorities, and popular demonstrations over old grievances and new expectations.
The fall of Hasina’s increasingly repressive rule has led to a surge in politically motivated violence. In the first week after her departure, suspected BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) activists and other vigilantes killed almost 250 people, mostly AL leaders, members, and police officers across the country. They also burned hundreds of AL leaders’ homes, party offices, and police stations. Such violence is common in Bangladesh, where political transitions often trigger cycles of retribution. As the security situation improved with the interim government’s arrival and the return of most police officers to their jobs, BNP and JEI activists have continued to harass AL members. Despite senior BNP and JEI leaders urging restraint, both parties seem intent on denying the AL any public platform. This situation will likely hinder the interim government’s efforts to create an open and peaceful environment for political campaigning in the lead-up to the elections.
Within a week of Hasina’s resignation, there were at least 200 attacks on Hindus and other religious minorities, according to the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council advocacy group. Most of these attacks appear to have been politically motivated, targeting AL leaders and supporters of Hindu origin, as the party has historically been more inclusive of religious minorities. However, some incidents have specifically targeted minorities on the basis of their religion. If the interim government fails to investigate and bring the perpetrators to justice, sectarian violence could become more normalised in the foreseeable future.
In neighbouring India, traditional media and social media accounts have launched a large-scale misinformation campaign exaggerating the number of attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh, with many influential accounts sharing unverified, outdated or simply false content. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his first statement on Bangladesh and first phone call with Yunus, stressed the importance of protecting Hindus and other minorities. Consequently, these attacks pose not only a security challenge for the interim government but also significant diplomatic and reputational concerns going forward.
Hasina’s ouster and the rise of the interim government have sparked greater civic activism. With newfound freedoms of expression and assembly, demonstrations have emerged over various grievances including religious minorities demanding greater protection and former police officers seeking reinstatement. Workers in the garment sector, the country’s largest industry, have also called for better pay and conditions. As the interim government seems more receptive to addressing popular grievances, such incidents could increase over the coming months. The anti-Hasina protests, driven by demands for fairer access to government jobs amid high youth unemployment, highlight the risk of future unrest if socio-economic issues are not addressed effectively.
If the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat-e-Islam parties initiate protests calling for elections, the interim government, lacking its own political support base, may struggle to contain the situation effectively.”
Another potentially disruptive source of protests is the BNP and JEI. While these parties have welcomed the interim government, they are demanding quick elections. The longer the elections are delayed, the more time the AL has to reorganise itself, frustrating BNP and JEI. If they launch mass protests demanding elections, the interim government, lacking its own political base, may struggle to contain the situation effectively.
The Yunus administration’s success hinges on managing immediate crises while fostering a long-term vision for Bangladesh. Beyond addressing security and institutional decay, Yunus has the chance to implement structural reforms that could reshape the country’s political and economic future. However, this depends on maintaining public trust, avoiding partisan perceptions, and navigating unpredictable factors like the effects of the BNP and JEI’s immediate political aspirations.