General elections proceeded in Bangladesh on 7 January 2024 despite major opposition parties boycotting the vote. Unsurprisingly, the ruling Awami League party emerged practically unchallenged, securing 222 of 300 parliamentary seats and facilitating the appointment of Sheikh Hasina as the country’s Prime Minister for a fourth consecutive term. The Jatiya Party, one of the few opposition parties to contest the election, won 11 parliamentary seats, with independent candidates - supposedly appointed by the Awami League to create a veneer of competitive elections - securing the remaining posts.
Given the circumstances under which the ballots were cast, there is doubt around whether the results truly reflect voter preferences. The Awami League’s victory is the result of only around 40 percent of eligible voters participating in the elections - according to officials - far lower than the 80 percent voter turnout noted in 2018. Historically, Bangladesh has been almost equally split between Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) supporters, and given the BNP’s boycott, voter turnout was expected to be low. Yet, with allegations of ballot stuffing reported at some voting stations and a voter turnout of 27.15 percent recorded just one hour before polls closed, the voter participation figure is likely to have been significantly lower than claimed.
Despite the lead-up to elections being marred by frequent anti-government protests, bouts violence and alleged human rights abuses by law enforcement officials, the risk of prolonged civil unrest and a political crisis in Bangladesh are low. The opposition does not have the capability to sufficiently pressure the Awami League due in part to the sentencing of more than 150 opposition leaders and activists, and the arrests of over 13,000 BNP workers since October 2023. More importantly, since gaining power in 2008, the Awami League has launched a major clampdown on the BNP and other opposition parties, while centralising power in the process. It appointed loyalists to important government institutions and law enforcement agencies including the police, military, the election commission and the judiciary, enabling the ruling party to employ various measures necessary to quell dissent and contain anti-government activism.
The people’s resolve, however, should not be underestimated. Bangladesh has a history of popular uprising. In 1990, a popular uprising brought an end to Bangladesh’s military leadership, while most recently from 2006-2008, voter dissatisfaction with general elections saw the country face a political crisis that lasted two years. This most recent political crisis was marked by violent riots and frequent protests which disrupted the country’s logistics and transportation links. The political crisis finally came to an end in December 2008 when the caretaker government moved to hold free and fair elections. At present, while prolonged unrest is unlikely, the resolve of the electorate to effectuate change, or in the least challenge the Awami League, cannot be discounted.
An additional element to consider is international pressure. As Bangladesh’s largest export partners, the US and the European Union (EU) maintain considerable clout in Bangladesh. The US has in the past implemented sanctions on individuals in Bangladesh’s ruling elite to deter human rights violations and election interference in the country. It also retains the ability to pressure Bangladesh through the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) lending programme. The EU, in addition, could alter the terms of its export allowances for Bangladesh through its Generalised Scheme of Preferences, under which Bangladesh benefits from zero tariff exports to the bloc. However, amid persistent cost of living pressure in both the US and EU, and Bangladesh’s improving relations with China that makes the West wary of alienating Bangladesh, the US and its allies are unlikely to impose punitive measures beyond narrowly targeted sanctions on Bangladesh.
With elections out of the way, the Awami League will be able to refocus its efforts on Bangladesh’s fragile economy. Over the course of 2023, Bangladesh had been challenged with high inflation, fuel shortages and falling foreign reserves, forcing the country to seek a multibillion-dollar IMF loan to prevent an economic crisis similar to Sri Lanka. Addressing these issues could help the Awami League legitimise its rule, but its track record in maintaining economic development and investment has been lacklustre. Major infrastructure projects such as the Matabari deep-sea port development and a 227 km express railway connecting Dhaka with Chittagong, have faced significant delays due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and planned projects risk postponement due to the country’s low foreign exchange reserves. The slow pace of infrastructure upgrades has seen Bangladesh’s ranking in the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index decline from 79 in 2010 to 88 in 2023. By comparison, Vietnam improved its ranking from 53 to 43 over the same period. Infrastructure bottlenecks will also inhibit the competitiveness of Bangladesh’s growth-generating garment sector, and risk the loss foreign investment opportunities to Southeast Asian counterparts.
Without long-term security of foreign exchange reserves and employment opportunities from the garment sector, the Awami League will be challenged in its ability to satisfy the demands of Bangladesh’s growing population. As such, although the Awami League does not face any credible threats to its rule at this stage, it is likely to remain wary of a pronounced economic downturn that could drive opposition-led protests and a popular uprising, reminiscent of Sri Lanka in 2022.